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THE MORAL RIGHTS OF THE AUTHOR: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY*
The civil law countries have developed a system for protecting
the author which, in theory at least, is quite distinguishable from
the United States system of copyright. The civil law concept, developed chiefly in France and Germany,1 is termed droit moral or
the moral rights of the author. United States protection, given
through the Federal Copyright Act,2 is concerned with the economic aspects of creating a work, since copyright is proprietary in
nature. The moral right countries view their protection as purely
personal to the author, independent of any economic or property
considerations, and therefore inalienable. The moral rights concept will first be defined and broken into its various components.
Then United States cases and the theories by which the courts afford relief to the artist will be examined.
A list of moral rights might include:
1. The right to be known to the public as the creator of the
work.
2. The right to prevent others from attributing to the author
a work that he has not in fact written.
3. The right to prevent others from being treated as the author
of his work.
4. The right to prevent others from making deforming changes
or truncations of the work.
5. The right to withdraw a published work from distribution
if the views expressed no longer represent the author's
opinion.3
In broad terms these rights have been divided into two groups,
rights one through three representing the paternity right and
four and five, the right to the integrity of the work. Closely connected with the paternity right is the right to create a work. Moral
right countries will not compel an author (assuming he has con4
tracted to do so) to create :and publish a work against his will,
and this result would of course follow in the United States. The
right to the integrity of the work does not include a right to pre* This article was originally submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at Dickinson School of Law, 1966.
1. Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J.CoMP. L. 506
(1955).
2. 17 U.S.C. (1964).
3. See NIMMER, COPYriGHT 443 (1965).
4. Strauss, supra note 1, at 511.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

vent complete destruction of a creation. 5 The rationale seems to be
that destruction does not injure the author's reputation. The integrity right exists to guard against subjecting the author to criticism that he does not deserve. A truncation or deformation presents the author to the public as the creator of a work which he has
in fact not created, while destruction does not have this result. 6
The Berne Convention, in the 1928 Rome revision, extended
the moral right doctrine to all member countries. The rights were
divided into the two components of paternity and integrity of the
work:
(1) Independently of the author's copyright, and even
after transfer of the said copyright, the author shall
have the right to claim ownership of the work, as well
as the right to object to any distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of the said work which would be
prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
(2) The determination of the conditions under which these
rights shall be exercised is reserved for the national
legislation of the countries of the Union. . ..
The Brussels Conference of 1948 broadened the above protection
even further. A phrase giving the author "any other action in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation..
"8 was added.
Also, the rights granted "shall, after
his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the copyright,
and shall be exercisable: by the persons or institutions authorized. . . ."9 While the Rome text left the drafting of legislation to
protect the author's rights to the member countries, the Brussels
text leaves this determination only for the time after the author's
death. 10
Although the United States is not a member of the Berne
Union," Americans may still receive the benefits of this interna-

tional treaty.' 2 Article 6 states:
(1) Authors who are not nationals of one of the countries
of the Union, and who first publish their works in one
of those countries, shall enjoy in that country the same
rights as native authors, and in the other countries of
5. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940).
6. Ibid.
7. Art. 6 bis Berne Convention (1928).
8. Art. 6 bis (1) Berne Convention (1948).
9. Id. at 6 bis (2); See ROTHENBERG, LEGAL PROTECTION OF LITERATURE,
ART AND MUSIC 155 (1960).

10. Strauss, supra note 1, at 507.
11. There are forty-two members of the 1928 Rome Revision Berne
Convention and twenty-three members of the 1948 Brussels Revision, including France and Great Britain.
12. ROTHENBERG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 143.
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the Union the rights granted by the present convention.13
Published works are defined by the convention as "works, copies of
which have been issued and made available in sufficient quantities
to the public ....,1*4A publication is considered a first publication when it is published simultaneously in a Berne country and a
non-Berne country. 15 A simultaneous publication occurs when a
work is published in a Berne country within thirty days after the
first publication, and the Berne country is considered the country
of origin. 16 Therefore, an American who publishes his work in a
Berne country within thirty days after he has published in the
United States is fully protected under the convention.
The central question in any discussion of moral rights is whether the protection afforded is materially different from that in the
United States. The argument in favor of moral rights has been
advanced in a few cases, 17 but courts have been reluctant to afford
any relief on those grounds. American commentators 8 have
criticized United States protection. One has argued that the copyright law protects the economic exploitation of the fruits of artistic creation. 19 Other writers 20 have concluded that United States
protection is substantially the same as that of moral rights. The
traditional common law theories of libel, unfair competition, copyright and the right of privacy, it is claimed, are sufficient protection. Case law will now be examined in an effort to decide the
controversy.
The law of libel and unfair competition has been used to protect the author's right to the integrity of his work.2 1 Numerous
cases may be cited to demonstrate this conclusion. 22 Yet it should
be pointed out that protecting the integrity right by libel or unfair
competition is subject to important limitations. A distortion or
truncation connected with a use that is also a violation of the copyright act does not constitute a claim separate and distinct from
the claim of copyright infringement. 23 In Harms Inc. v. Tops
13. Art. 6 Berne Convention (1948).
14. Art. 4(4) Berne Convention (1948).
15. Art. 4(3) Berne Convention (1948).
16. Ibid.
17. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
18. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law,
24 So. CAL. L. REV. 375 (1951); Roeder, supra note 5.
19. Roeder, supra note 5, at 557.
20. Strauss, supra note 1; 35 CONN. B.J. 509 (1961).
21. Strauss, supra note 1, at 525.
22. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Curwood v. Affiliated
Distributors, 283 Fed. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); DeBekker v. Stokes, 168 App.
Div. 452, 153 N.Y. Supp. 1066 (1916).
23. NiMmE_, op. cit. supra note 3, at 444.
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Music Enterprises2 4 the plaintiff tried to recover for copyright
infringement and unfair competition. The court stated:
Granted that ... the facts which prove [copyright] in-

fringement may also prove unfair competition, in the realm
of copyright, the title cannot be dissociated from the song
and the claim be made that it having been associated with
the author, there can be recovery for both infringement of
the copyright and unfair competition. The cause of action
is one,-namely violation of the copyright through unauthorized recording. It cannot be split into two causes of
action ....25
The author may contract away his ability to stop deformations
or truncations, 26 and this may be done by very broad contract language. In Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.27 the court was faced
with a book, the translation of which may have consciously sought
to sensationalize and inject pungent language and express the translator's own conceptions. 2 The defendant had sold the plaintiff's
book to a French publishing house under a contract in which the
author had agreed to "grant, bargain, sell, convey, transfer, and
set over unto the said Simon & Schuster, Inc., the sole and exclusive
right to publish, print and put on the market the said work....
[A]dditional rights .

.

. consist of all abridgement, translation,

. ..and other publication and editorial rights ...."26 The court,
although recognizing the need to protect authors who work with
intellectual rather than with tangible property, 0 denied the author
relief! The contract was simply interpreted as a relinquishment
of the author's right to complain.
Another aspect of the moral right doctrine is the artist's defense against excessive criticism, that criticism made solely for the
purpose of vexation. 3' This is a protected right since it directly
affects the artist's reputation and honour. The French solution to
this problem is both novel to our law and satisfactory. Anyone
attacked may reply in the same medium. 32 The protection afforded
in the United States is libel. State retraction statutes, pointed to
in one article,33 certainly do not approximate French protection.
Libel also falls short since the action may require proof of falsity,
24. 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Calif. 1958).
25. Id. at 82.
26. NIMMER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 444. See Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1957); Jones v. American Law
Book Co., 125 App. Div. 519, 109 N.Y.Supp. :706 (1908).
27. 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 6 Misc. 2d 383 (1957).
28. Id. at 773.
29. Id. at 772.
30. Id. at 774.
31. Strauss, supra note 1, at 513.
32. Id. at 514.
33. 35 CoNN. B.J. 509 at 515 (1961).
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malice, and damages.3 4 Furthermore, even though a reputation
may be tainted, the libel action dies with the plaintiff.
The right of the artist to determine whether or not to publish
his work is adequately protected in the United States. The copyright law provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the
right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work,
at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefore.8 5
The moral rights author has a right to modify his work when
it no longer reflects his beliefs. 36 This right to modify does not
entitle the author to withdraw the work from sale8 7 or circulation"8 but he may make additions or modifications which better
relay to the public his changing views.3 9 The right may only be
exercised before publication of an edition and the artist must be
prepared to indemnify the publisher for any expenses caused by
invoking the right. 40 No corresponding right exists in American
4
case law or in the United States copyright statute. 1
Probably the most important moral right concept is the paternity right. This obligation to disclose the author's name on his
work also extends to the nom de plume, protection the author's
identity as he has chosen it.42 The pen name has been protected
in the United States. 43 The more difficult problem in our case law
is whether the author does have an inherent right to have his
name appear on his work. Clemmens v. Press Publishing Co. 44 has
been widely quoted 45 to support the proposition that he does:
Even the matter of fact attitude of the law does not require us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary production in the same way that we consider the sale of a barrel of pork ....

The man who sells a barrel of pork to an-

other may pocket the purchase price and retain no further
interest in what becomes of the pork. While an author
may write to earn his living, and may sell his literary pro34. Roeder, supra note 5, at 572.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); See Strauss, supra note 1, at 530.
36. Roeder, supra note 5, at 565.
37. 35 CONN. B.J. 509 at 514.
38. Strauss, supra note 1, at 531. Strauss points to statutes that permit
the author to withdraw the work from circulation; but this is more in the
form of a penalty resulting from the actions of a publisher who so modified
the work as to injure the author's reputation.
39. Roeder, supra note 5, at 565.
40. Ibid.
41. Strauss, supra note 1, at 531.
42. Roeder, supra note 5, at 562.
43. Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.Supp. 483 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
44. 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y. Supp. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
45. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 521; 35 CONN. B.J. 509, 511 (1961).
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ductions, yet the purchaser, in the absence of a contract
which permits him so to do, cannot make as free a use of it
as he could the pork which he purchases ....

He had the

right to insist that the
story should not be published ex46
cept under his name.

It is to be noted that the above language appears in a concurring opinion. Clemmens actually held that the defendant publisher had no right to withhold payment to plaintiff for his article,
when the plaintiff objected to its publication without his name.
The contract was mute on the question of whether plaintiff's name
should appear and the court stated:
Title to the manuscript having passed by the completed
contract made .

.

. the defendant was not obligated to

publish it at all, nor could plaintiff compel or prevent its
publication, with or without his name. The objections,
refusals, and wishes of the plaintiff after parting with the
title in the property may betray the eccentricities of the
author; but they have no greater weight in law than the
wishes of4 Ta stranger to the transaction after it was com-

pensated.

Other cases cast doubt on the American author's inherent paternity
right. Certainly the author should be permitted to contract this
right away; but what amounts to a contractual waiver? In Vargas
v. Esquire Inc.48 the court disallowed an artist's suit where he
attempted to stop publication of his pictures without his name appearing on them. The court interpreted the contract as granting
all paternity rights to Esquire. The fact that no reservation appeared in the contract "strongly indicat[ed] that it was intentionally omitted. '49 This raises a serious question. Can silence
amount to a waiver of the paternity right by the artist? Although
some have concluded that silence is not enough,50 one writer feels,
through examination of a line of cases, 51 that it is the obligation of
the artist to affirmatively state in the contract of sale that his name
52
shall appear on the work.
Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,53 supports this
latter view. Plaintiff writer was suing for damages because of
46. 67 Misc. at 184-86, 122 N.Y.Supp. at 207-08.
.47. Id. at 185, 122 N.Y.Supp. at 207.
48. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
49. Id. at 526. This case is criticized by Katz, supra note 18, at 412.
50. Strauss, supra note 1, at 525; 35 CONN. B.J. 509, 511.
51. Malloy v. MacKaye, 86 Fed. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1898), rev'd on other
grounds 92 Fed. 749 (2d Cir. 1899); Clemmens v. Press Publishing Co., 67
Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.Supp. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Morton v. Raphael, 334 Ill.
399, 79 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F.Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Nelson v. R.C.A., 148 F.Supp 1 (S.D.Fla. 1957).
52. NIMMER, op. cit. supranote 3, at 450.
53. 43 F.Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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defendant's failure to mention her as a collaborator in the screen
credits for a motion picture. The court said that plaintiff had
transferred all her right, title and interest in her original literary
composition by express contract.5 4 This precluded plaintiff from
complaining, even though the defendant gave full credit to one
Bloomfield, a collaborator who worked with plaintiff on the script.
It is important to note that no express relinquishment of the paternity right appeared in the contract. The broad language,
granting "all right, title and interest," was construed however, as
encompassing the paternity right. The author had sold her right
away.
Although United States protection is adequate in most areas,
the common law action for libel is unsatisfactory to protect the
author from excessive criticism. The French solution, discussed
previously, goes far to balance the equities between the dangers of
censorship and the totally unwarranted attack on an author. Furthermore, the author's right to be credited as the creator of his
work should be protected beyond all doubt. The presumption
should be in favor of the creator-absent an express relinquishment, the publisher must give the author credit for the work. 5
Case law, especially as to paternity, has failed to lend any degree
of certainty and predictability. The area clamors for legislation.
ALBERT

R.

RAGO

54. Id. at 121.
55. Few recent cases deal with the specific problems discussed. This
is not necessarily an indication that the problems do not exist. The artist,
the author, the creative person, is not the individual in our society who
does business with a lawyer at his side. It is submitted that trade custom
and usage in the publishing business may be so standardized that little contract negotiation is possible. The unknown creator, if he wants to publish,
simply signs the necessary papers. In the unusual situation, when conflicts arise, he may realize too late that a vague contract phrase has left him
little ground to complain.

